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FOREWORD
The bulletins in this series, entitled “ Prospects for Agricul­
tural Recovery,” will deal with the marked improvement that 
has taken place in industry since the low point of the depression 
early in 1933, and with the relatively small amount of improve­
ment that has taken place in the condition of agriculture. They 
will deal with the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the other 
measures passed during the special session of Congress, and with 
the present and prospective effects of this legislation on agricul­
ture and on the country as a whole.
Last year, Iowa State College published a series of 10 cir­
culars under the general heading, “ The Agricultural Emergency 
in Iowa.” 1 These circulars drew attention to the gravity of the 
agricultural situation, and discussed measures for remedying it. 
This year the situation has changed. Drastic remedial legislation 
has been passed, some improvement has taken place, and the out­
look is not so dark as it was a year ago. Public interest now is 
focused upon the recovery measures that have been enacted into 
law.
These recovery measures are revolutionary in character and 
complicated in detail. Many people are confused as to their 
nature and significance. What are these measures? What do 
they mean ? Where will they take us ? These questions are up­
permost in people’s minds. The purpose of the present series of 
bulletins is to throw some light on these questions.
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Prospects for Agricultural Recovery
I. The Economic Situation in 1933
B y  G eoffrey S h eph erd
A year ago, in h bulletin entitled, “ The Situation Today,”  we 
surveyed the economic condition of agriculture and of the United 
States as a whole. The picture then was black. Looking about 
us, we saw the whole country prostrated, as if by some great 
physical catastrophe. We saw idle factories on every hand, idle 
locomotives and freight cars on the railroad tracks, millions of 
idle men in the streets. We saw four out of every five steelmill 
blast furnaces shut down, and two out of every three automobile 
factories closed ; we saw the manufacturing and mining plant of 
the country as a whole limping along and producing goods at 
little more than half its capacity.
When we looked into the records of the market place, we saw 
more evidence of economic upheaval. We saw that the prices 
of some products had remained roughly constant for several 
years, wfiile the prices of others had declined heavily; we ob­
served that agricultural products, especially, were selling at one- 
half, one-third, or one-quarter of their previous prices. We saw 
hogs on Iowa livestock markets selling for $3 per hundred pounds, 
beef cattle for $5, corn for 10 cents a bushel, and oats for 7 cents.
When we looked into the financial records, we were appalled 
by the economic disorganization that was sweeping over the 
country. We saw farm mortgage foreclosures proceeding at a 
rate of nearly 500 a month in Iowa alone.2 We saw bank failures 
in the United States mounting rapidly, more than a thousand 
banks having closed during the first three-quarters of* the year 
1932; defaulted bonds, lost savings, and vanished equities were 
apparent on every hand. And when we looked into the minds 
of the people we found pessimism, bewilderment and revolt.
THE CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE
That was the condition of the country a year ago, near the 
end of 1932—a picture in dark and somber colors. Let us keep 
that picture fresh in mind. Then let us trace the swiftly moving 
events that have led from the situation a year ago to the situa­
tion now. This will help us to understand conditions as they 
are today, near the end of 1933.
The beginning of 1933 brought no improvement in economic 
conditions. Indeed, as the new year began, the depression 
deepened. Industrial production continued to decline, prices con­
tinued to fall, banks continued to fail.
Then, on March 4, financial panic struck the country. Catas­
trophe piled up on disaster. A  banking holiday in Detroit spread
3
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4to the whole state of Michigan, and from there to other states. 
People lost confidence in their banks and began to draw out their 
money wholesale; some lost confidence even in their money and 
began to demand gold.
The drain of currency and gold was terrific. The demand for 
currency in the New York federal reserve district rose _ from 
$5,000,000 in the first week of February to $625,000,000 in the 
first week of March. From Feb. 1 to March 4, the gold re­
serves of the Federal Reserve System were drawn down from 
65.6 to 45.1 percent.3 The reserves of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York fell below the legal minimum of 40 percent. The 
movement engulfed the whole country. The President called a 
national banking holiday, and for a week every bank in the 
United States was closed.
THE CRISIS
The situation was extraordinarily critical. The country was 
already suffering from reduced purchasing power. The tem­
porary closing of the banks reduced purchasing power still fur­
ther. It became clear that after the crisis was oyer, only the 
stronger banks should be allowed to reopen; and this meant that 
a good deal of the purchasing power available would be tied up 
in the unopened banks for some time. It was evident, therefore, 
that production would be curtailed still further; and that unem­
ployment, already standing at 13 millions or more, would be still 
further increased.
The situation called for prompt and drastic action. To this call, 
the country responded. The new congress was convened in spe­
cial session on March 5. During the short hundred days of its 
life, it passed in rapid succession measures that will probably be 
recorded as the most radical and revolutionary peace-time legis­
lation in our history.
The country had been forced off the gold standard. It was 
kept off. Emergency bank legislation was passed. Veteran’s pen­
sions and federal employee’s salaries were reduced as part of a 
program for balancing the budget. The President was given 
broad and startling powers of currency inflation. Provision was 
made for raising agricultural prices to pre-war parity by reducing 
agricultural production. Machinery was set up for refinancing 
mortgages on farms and homes all over the country. A  huge 
program of public works was instituted. And, last and most rad­
ical of all, the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed.
RECOVERY BEGINS
The dominant spirit running through all these measures was 
the spirit of action by society as a whole. The United States, 
rendered desperate by 4 years of depression, turned from its 
traditional policy of “ rugged individualism”— the philosophy of
4
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5“hands off,”  “ let society ran itself”  and “ no government in busi­
ness.” For the time being, the emphasis was shifted from indi­
vidualism to a new philosophy of “ social control” and “ a planned 
economy.”
There is no need to enter here into the argument as to which 
of these two opposed policies is the better. The fact is that in 
the emergency which existed, the new policy brought immediate 
results. When the grain and stock exchanges opened, after the 
one-week banking holiday, the prices quoted on those exchanges 
were sharply higher. Consumers and business men who pre­
viously had refrained from buying goods for fear of further 
deflation, now began to buy in fear of impending inflation. The 
demand for goods increased, and industrial production responded. 
Presently, as the outline of the National Recovery Act (the 
NR A ) began to appear, industrial manufacturers stepped up 
their production hastily in order to have a stock of goods on 
hand, made before the higher wages of the NRA should go into 
effect and increase their production costs. All over the land, 
factory doors began to reopen, factory chimneys started to smoke; 
the wheels of industry began to turn at an accelerated pace.
The psychological atmosphere of the country changed from 
pessimism to cautious optimism. Previously, the vicious spiral of 
depression had worked downward. Men who had had their wages 
reduced and might have been cut off entirely, had reduced their 
buying to a minimum. This curtailed buying threw other men out 
of work and curtailed their buying, and so the depression spread. 
But now the spiral was reversed; it worked upward. Men who 
previously had deferred buying because they expected prices to 
continue falling, now began buying because they expected prices 
to rise. They started buying before prices should rise, and their 
very buying caused the rise in prices to occur. Purchasing power 
is the force that pulls our economic machinery along; and this 
power, so much a matter of psychology, had now began to spiral 
upward instead of downward.
W H AT STARTED RECOVERY?
Thus, after agricultural and business conditions in the United 
States had been going from bad to worse for 4 years, they 
now seemed to have struck bottom and turned upward. Over­
powering forces had borne the country to the ground; now these 
forces of destruction were themselves overpowered by stronger 
forces working upward.
What were these strengthening forces? What were these 
energies that turned the tide of depression back toward recovery? 
There are two views on this question.
According to the first view, the force that started the upturn 
in March, 1933, was the emergency legislation passed by the spe­
cial session of the new congress. This legislation, it is held,
5
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6rectified many of the conditions that were accentuating the de­
pression, and set other forces— inflation, for example -actively 
at work to pull the 
c o u n t r y  o u t  of its 
trouble. These measures 
changed the psychology 
of the situation from 
one of helplessness  ^ to 
one of aggressive action, 
and released psychologi­
cal forces of tremendous 
power.
According to the sec­
ond view, the depression 
had spent its force by 
March, 1933, and a nat­
ural recovery would 
have set in .then of it­
self, legislation or no 
legislation. Those who 
hold this view point out 
that a natural recovery 
started in the summer 
of 1932 in all of the 
principal foreign coun­
tries, and was held in 
check in the United 
States only by banking 
difficulties. With these
difficulties removed, they . . . . . .
m a i n t a i n ,  r e c o v e r y  Fi^  B  Industrial activity g eight countnes.
would have come about of itself in the United States whether 
any emergency legislation had been passed or not. Those who 
hold this view buttress their case by referring to the indexes of 
business activity in foreign countries. These indexes are based 
upon statistics of physical production and car loadings in the 
countries concerned.4 These indexes are shown in- fig. 1. Prac­
tically all of them show recovery beginning in the middle of 1932.
We are not here concerned with the argument between these 
opposing views. At least, the emergency money and banking 
legislation passed by the new congress was an indispensable pre­
requisite to recovery, and had immediate effects. Production was 
speeded up, also, by manufacturers who were rushing to make 
as many goods as possible before the prospective NRA codes 
should go into effect. Whether the other measures are beneficial 
or not cannot as yet be objectively determined. That question 
the future will decide.
JAPAN /
ITALY
l
I S
P i
V A m
V
kl
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7In any case, a strong upturn took place. The extent of the im­
provement is measured by the changes that have taken place in 
production, employment and prices.
PRODUCTION INCREASES
The Federal Reserve Board’s index of the production of manu­
factures and minerals in the United States (the base for this 
index is 1923-25=100) jumped from 60 in March to 66 in April, 
to 77 in May, 90 in June and 100 in July. This is a rise of 67 
percent— the most rapid increase in industrial production ever 
recorded in history. After July, thé production index receded to 
91 in August and to 84 in September.
The striking recovery in industrial production, and the sub­
sequent recession, is shown in graphic form in fig. 2. The index 
of the production of manufactures and minerals combined,5 
after touching 100 in July, stands now (September) at 84. This 
means that industrial production has increased to within 16 per­
cent of normal— a good recovery, when 6 months ago industrial 
production was only 60 perceilt of normal. ,
Employment'Jias not recovered as rapidly as production. The 
index of factory employment, which fell below 60 in March 
(1923-25=100) had risen only to 74.3 by September, 1933. It is 
significant that up to August, when the NRA codes went into 
effect, employment rose much less than production, and payrolls 
rose even more slowly than employment. After August, under 
the influence of the new codes, payrolls and employment rose
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Fig. 2. Index of production of manufactures and minerals combined. Adjusted for 
seasonal variation. 1923-25=100.
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8more rapidly than production. This situation was pointed to with 
pride by the NRA as an evidence that the NRA was increasing 
the worker’s employment and purchasing power, and accelerating 
recovery; it was viewed with alarm by industrialists as an evi­
dence that the NRA was reducing profits and retarding recovery.
THE BANKING SITUATION IMPROVES
Banking failures ceased almost entirely after the national bank 
holiday in March. This cessation resulted, not so much from the 
improvement in general conditions, as from the fact that the 
only banks that were allowed to reopen were those that could 
stay open.6 But at least for the time being, the uncertainty in 
the' minds of depositors was settled, and currency began to flow 
back to the banks. Between March 13 and August 30, about 2 
billion dollars of hoarded currency were returned to the Federal 
Reserve banks and the Treasury.7
When the United States went off the gold standard, the threat 
of inflation caused a “ flight of capital” from the United States 
to other countries. From March to the end of August, more 
than a billion dollars fled the country. These dollars were not 
gold dollars; exports of gold were prohibited.^ They were not 
paper dollars. Primarily, they were telegraphic dollars. They 
moved through the mechanism of the foreign exchanges.
This flow of funds abroad turned the foreign exchanges 
against us, and the value of the dollar, in terms of other cur­
rencies, fell heavily. People were so anxious to get their money 
out of the country before inflation cheapened its domestic pur­
chasing power that they continued to offer it for other currencies 
abroad even when their offerings had depreciated the foreign 
gold value of the dollar to about 65 cents.8
PRICES RISE
The value of our dollar fell in terms of foreign currencies, 
and conversely the value of foreign currencies rose in terms 
of our dollar.' A  French franc or a British pound would there­
fore buy more wheat, cotton and other commodities in the 
United States than before. Accordingly, the prices of wheat, cot­
ton, etc., in the United States rose step by step with the fall of 
the foreign exchanges.
This rise helped to stimulate a general rise of prices in the 
United States. The powers of monetary inflation conferred upon 
the President did not need to be exercised. The mere threat of 
inflation sufficed. This threat was reinforced by the departure 
from the gold standard and the probability of the eventual re­
duction of the gold content of the dollar. This was sufficient 
to start consumers and producers on a wave of purchasing. This 
purchasing, this increased demand for goods, caused prices to 
rise. The index of the general level of wholesale commodity 
prices, as fig. 3 shows, rose steadily, month by month, from the
8
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Fig. 3. Index of the general level of wholesale commodity prices.
low point of 87 in February, 1933, to 103 in October, 1933. (The 
base for this index is 1910-14=100.) The general price level 
now, therefore, is slightly higher than it was before the war.
This does not mean, of course, that all the groups of prices 
making up this general index have recovered equally. The prices 
of farm products are still much lower than they were before the 
war, while the prices of some other groups of commodities— tex­
tile products, building materials, and metals and metal products, 
for instance— are higher.
THE CONDITION OF AGRICULTURE
Agriculture has participated to some extent in the general 
recovery. The improvement cannot be measured by an index of 
production like that of industry. Agricultural production did not 
decline during depression, and it probably will not increase 
markedly during recovery. The chief indexes of improvement in 
agriculture are to be found in the record of agricultural prices 
and agricultural purchasing power.
AGRICULTURAL PRICES
During the depression, the prices of farm products and other 
raw materials fell much more than the prices of other goods. 
This was partly because the costs of distribution from producer 
to consumer remained practically fixed, and partly because agri­
cultural production continued at full capacity in spite of the gen-
9
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1926 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Figr. 4. Index of the prices of the goods that farmers sell compared with the index 
of prices of the goods that farmers buy.
eral reduction in demand. The decline in agricultural prices is 
shown by the lower line in fig. 4.
It was expected that when conditions improved, the prices of 
farm products would rise more than other prices, just as they 
had previously fallen more than other prices.
This expectation was realized, but only to a small - extent. 
Figure 4 shows that the index of agricultural prices rose from 
49 in February, 1933, to 70 in October. This is a rise of 21 
points. The general price level (shown in fig. 3) over the same 
period, rose from 87 to 103. This is a rise of 16 points.9 This 
is almost as great as the rise in agricultural prices.
Within the group of farm products, some prices have risen 
less than others. The price of hogs, for example, rose very little. 
Beef cattle prices rose even less. The prices of the speculative 
commodities rose strongly early in the summer, in anticipation 
of inflation. Wheat and corn prices rose, slowly at first, and 
then more and more rapidly. By July a runaway bull market 
developed in both wheat and corn, and in the stock market too. 
Corn rose from 23 cents a bushel at Chicago early in March to 
40 cents early in May and 65 cents by the middle o f July. Wheat 
rose from 47 cents to $1.17. Then came a violent reaction; prices 
crashed 20 to 25 cents a bushel in 2 days, and the market closed 
entirely for 5 days after that. Thereafter, grain and stock prices 
declined somewhat. During the past month they have held fairly 
constant.
10
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AGRICULTURAL PURCHASING POWER
Agricultural prices had fallen so low during the depression 
that the rise of 21 points from 49 in February to 70 in October, 
mentioned above, still represents less than a. SO percent recovery 
toward pre-war levels. And the prices of the goods that farmers 
buy, which never /ell as low as pre-war, have risen appreciably 
since February.9 They are represented by the upper line in fig. 4. 
The purchasing power of farm products (the ratio between the 
two indexes shown in fig. 4) is only 60. This is an improvement 
of only 11 points over the situation in February, when the pur­
chasing power of farm products stood at the extremely low figure 
of 49.
These price and purchasing power indexes do not tell quite 
the whole story. The producers of some commodities, who en­
tered into agreements with the Federal Government to reduce 
their production, have benefited by the receipt of adjustment pay­
ments. Up to Nov. 6, 1933, the Federal Government paid 103 
million dollars to cotton farmers who reduced their acreage in 
1933.19 This represents, a substantial percentage addition to the 
cotton farmer’s income.11 Hog producers also received 30 million 
dollars in premium payments for light weight hogs.12 This, how­
ever, is a relatively small percentage amount.13
For agriculture in the United States as a whole, the present 
picture can be summed up in a few sentences. The condition of 
agriculture has improved somewhat, but much less than, the im­
provement in the condition of the country as a whole. Agricul­
tural purchasing power has increased from the low point of 49 
percent of pre-war, in February, 1933, to 60 percent of pre-war 
now. This is an improvement of 11 percent. The condition of 
the cotton growers has improved more than these figures show, 
because they have received substantial acreage reduction pay­
ments from the Federal Government.
THE CONDITION OF IOWA AGRICULTURE
On Iowa farms, improvement has been uneven. The prices of 
some Iowa farm products have recovered strongly; the prices of 
others have not.
The extent of the improvement is shown in table I, which 
shows the state average prices of the 10 principal products at 
the farm. The index number representing the weighted average 
price of all 10 products, expressed as a percentage of the 1910-14 
average, is shown at the foot of the table.
The table shows the prices at three different dates— first, the 
average from 1927 to 1929, inclusive; second, January, 1933, the 
low point of the depression; and third, October, 1933, the most 
recent date available. O f the different commodities, it is evident
11
Shepherd: Prospects for agricultural recovery, I. The economic situation in
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1933
12
TABLE I. AVERAGE IOW A PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS14 
Prices Received by Producers
P rod u ct Av. 1927 to 1929 January, 1933 October, 1933
TT^c? 9.SO 2.40 4.104.55
2.409.87
3.90
er. 65 1.75
.76 .12
.40 .10
1.13 .34
g ay  ....................................... 12.66 5.30
.45 .21
.27 .18
.07 .075.19
144 41 63
that eggs butter, hay and beef cattle have improved least. The 
»rains have improved most. The weighted index stands now 
(October) at 63, which is 22 points above 41, the low figure
touched in January. , ,  ,
These indexes of prices and purchasing power show that the 
condition of Iowa agriculture has improved much less than the 
condition of the country as a whole. Because of the extremely 
low point to which agricultural prices fell early in 1933, the rise 
in prices since then appears substantial. But agricultural prices 
are still far below normal. And since the rise in the prices 
of the goods farmers sell has been accompanied by an almost 
equal rise in the prices of the goods they buy,* Iowa agriculture 
now is only slightly better off than at the lowest point of the 
depression.
THÈ IO W A FARM  MORTGAGE SITUATION
The Iowa farm mortgage situation has been somewhat eased. 
At the end of 1932 there were 1 billion dollars of farm mort­
gages outstanding in Iowa. The burden of carrying many of 
these mortgages was becoming unbearable ; foreclosures were pro­
ceeding at a terrific rate. Then, in January, 1933, the governor 
of Iowa proclaimed a farm mortgage moratorium, lhis was 
followed a month later by the Mortgage Moratorium Act of 
1933, passed by the Iowa legislature early in February, lhis 
Act provided that any farmer who was faced by foreclosure pro­
ceedings could file a plea with the court to have the foreclosure 
stayed until March, 1935. During the 2 years while the mora­
torium was to remain in force, the farmer should pay rent v&Jtne 
court, in an amount to be determined by the court. The court 
then disburses the money for taxes, insurance, upkeep of the
This moratorium temporarily protected the farmer from mort­
gage foreclosure proceedings, but it did not lighten the burden
lightened somewhat more than the load of other farmers.
12
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%
of carrying the mortgage. Relief on that score was offered from 
another direction, by the Federal Government. The Federal Farm 
Loan Act was amended in several important respects. In addi­
tion to first mortgage credit through the Federal Land Bank of 
Omaha, the Iowa farm owner may now apply for second mort­
gage credit frpm ay200-million-dollar fund made available by the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the farm loan commis­
sioner for the purpose of refinancing farm mortgages at lower 
rates. In addition,. the Farm Credit Act consolidated the eight 
different governmental farm credit agencies into one administra­
tion operating through four types of credit institutions. These 
acts and amendments (which will be discussed fully in the next 
bulletin of this series) opened the way to some lightening of the 
farmer’s mortgage load. Up to the present time, however, 
progress in carrying this program into effect has been slow.
THE FUTURE
At the present time, the initial spurt of improvement which 
the country as a whole has made since March seems to have run 
its course. The rise in production, employment and prices, which 
proceeded rapidly at first, has now slackened or ceased entirely ; 
in some cases, some recession has taken place. The present is an 
auspicious time, therefore, to take stock of the extent of the re­
covery that has been made, and to look forward over the ground 
ahead.
It is clear that the condition of industry is now materially bet­
ter than it was a year ago. It is clear that the psychological at­
mosphere of industry and commerce has improved. It is equally 
evident, however, that the condition of agriculture has not im­
proved very much.
In other .words, the country has climbed part way up the slope 
of recovery to a sort of resting place; industry is in the lead, 
and agriculture, struggling with heavy burdens, is some distance 
behind.
What is the lay of the land ahead? Have we reached a ledge, 
beyond which the ground rises steadily? Or are we merely on 
a plathau, beyond which the ground may decline again? And is 
agriculture likely to catch up with industry, or is it going to con­
tinue to lag behind?
The answers to these questions depend partly upon the work­
ing out of the recovery legislation passed by the special session 
of Congress. This legislation embodies the sincere efforts of 
many earnest and thoughtful men to overcome the depression. 
It represents a definite attempt to take hold of our economic 
system and make it work better. For generations in the past, we 
have said “hands off our economic machinery; let it run itself.”
13
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Now we are changing our thought. We are saying, “ this economic 
machinery is made by man; it can be controlled by man; we are 
going to try to control it.”
Can we succeed? The machinery is complex, and we do not 
know all that we should about it. W e have much to learn. It is 
the purpose of this series of bulletins to point out some of the 
problems, some of the opportunities, some of the dangers that 
are involved, so that we may meet these problems, these oppor­
tunities, and these dangers, with the best information and the best 
intelligence that we possess.
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Farm Mortgage Refinancing!
The refinancing of farm mortgages— one of the most 
pressing problems facing agriculture today— is the subject 
of the next bulletin in the series, “ Prospects for Agricul­
tural Recovery.”  It will deal in the most part with problems 
involved in the refinancing of farm mortgages in Iowa by 
the Farm Credit Administration. The discussion is not lim­
ited to the federal plan, however.
Dr. William G. Murray, the author, has made a number 
of farm mortgage studies in the state. In this bulletin he 
gives major attention to the problems of land appraisal and 
the scaling of debts: What is land worth ? What price level 
should be assumed in lending? How can debtors and cred­
itors get together on settlements? How is land appraised? 
How should it be appraised?
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